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When the government injects money through an open market operation, only those agents that are cur-
rently trading absorb these injections. Through their impact on these agents’ consumption, these money
injections affect real interest rates and real exchange rates. We show that the model generates the ob-
served negative relation between expected inflation and real interest rates. With moderate amounts of
segmentation, the model also generates other observed features of the data:  persistent liquidity effects in
interest rates and volatile and persistent exchange rates. A standard model with no fixed costs can produce
none of these features.
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Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Several features of the observed relationships between money and both interest rates and exchange
rates are diﬃcult to account for in standard monetary models. Motivated by the work of Baumol
(1952) and Tobin (1956), some economists have argued that adding frictions which lead to a
segmented market for trading money and interest-bearing assets might help improve these models.
(See Grossman and Weiss 1983, Rotemberg 1984, 1985, and Lucas 1990, among others.) Here we
build on this literature by developing a model with endogenously segmented asset markets. Our
model is both simple and promising as a way to account for the data.
In our model, agents must pay a ﬁxed cost to transfer money between the asset market
and the goods market. This ﬁxed cost leads agents to trade bonds and money only infrequently.
In any given period, only a fraction of agents are actively trading; that is, the asset market is
segmented. When the government injects money through an open market operation, then, only
the currently active agents are on the other side of the transaction, and only their marginal utilities
determine interest rates and exchange rates. Money injections are absorbed exclusively by these
active agents: the injections increase the agents’ current consumption; hence, real interest rates
fall and the real exchange rate depreciates. We refer to this eﬀect of money injections on real
interest rates and real exchange rates as the segmentation eﬀect.
Our main contribution here is to derive with pencil and paper the implications of segmented
asset markets for the relationships of money, interest rates, and exchange rates for stochastic
processes for shocks motivated by the data. Our derivation sheds light on how the complicated
relationships between money, interest rates, and exchanges rates are all driven by a simpler one,
namely, that between money injections and the marginal utility of active agents. We also show that
some predictions of a simple, quantitative version of our model come close to matching features
of the data which standard models without segmentation have not been able to produce.
Two features of interest rates have been discussed extensively in the literature. First, ex-
pected inﬂation and real interest rates generally move in opposite directions. This has been
documented by Barr and Campbell (1997) using indexed and nominal bonds. (See also Pennac-
chi 1991 and Campbell and Ammer 1993.) Second, at least since Friedman (1968), open market
operations have been thought to have liquidity eﬀects: money injections lead initially to a decline
in short-term nominal interest rates, a decline which is thought to decay over time, with short-
term rates eventually rising to normal levels or higher. Accordingly, money injections are thought
to steepen the yield curve, lowering long-term rates less than short-term rates, or even to twistthe yield curve by raising long-term rates. The vector autoregression (VAR) literature has been
somewhat successful in conﬁrming this pattern in the data. (See Cochrane 1994 and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans 1998.)
Our model with segmented asset markets can produce both of these features while a standard
model cannot. In a standard model without market segmentation, persistent money injections in-
crease expected inﬂation but have no eﬀects on real interest rates, so the model induces no relation
between them. In addition, these injections raise nominal interest rates of all maturities and ﬂatten
or even invert the yield curve. In our model, however, money injections move expected inﬂation
and real interest rates in opposite directions. These injections thus generate the negative correla-
tion between expected inﬂation and real interest rates that is observed in the data. Also, if asset
markets are suﬃciently segmented, money injections in our model have liquidity eﬀects: money
injections lower short-term nominal interest rates and steepen or even twist the yield curve by
lowering short rates and raising long ones. We show that with moderate amounts of segmentation,
our model can produce dynamic responses similar to those found in the VAR literature. (More-
over, our model generates persistent real eﬀects from market segmentation even from anticipated
shocks. Cochrane (1998) argues that a reasonable interpretation of the VAR results may require
models with this property.)
After our look at money and interest rates, we turn to some prominent features of money
and exchange rates. These features are diﬀerent for countries with diﬀerent rates of inﬂation. For
low inﬂation countries, real and nominal exchange rates have similar variability, they are highly
correlated, and both are persistent. For high inﬂation countries, real exchange rates are much less
volatile than nominal exchange rates.
A standard model can produce none of these features, but our endogenously segmented
model can produce them all. In a standard model, money injections do not aﬀect real exchange
rates, and they aﬀect nominal exchange rates only through their impact on inﬂation. In our
model, in contrast, when inﬂation is low, asset markets are segmented and money injections have
a substantial impact on real exchange rates. With moderate amounts of segmentation, therefore,
real and nominal exchange rates have similar variability, they are highly correlated, and both
are persistent, just as in the data. When inﬂation is high, agents trade more frequently, markets
become less segmented, and money injections have a smaller impact on real exchange rates. Hence,
in our model as in the data on high inﬂation countries, real exchange rates are signiﬁcantly less
3volatile than nominal exchange rates.
Our model with segmented markets is a standard cash-in-advance model with the addition
of ﬁxed costs for agents to exchange money and bonds. In our model, the household begins each
period with some cash in the goods market and then splits into a worker and a shopper. The
worker sells the current endowment for cash, and the shopper decides either to buy goods with
just the current real balances or to pay the ﬁxed cost to transfer cash to or from the asset market
and then buy goods. The household’s endowment and, thus, the household’s cash holdings are
random and idiosyncratic.
The shopper follows a cutoﬀ rule that deﬁne zones of activity and inactivity for trading cash
and interest-bearing assets. In the zone of activity, shoppers with high real balances pay a ﬁxed
cost to transfer cash to the asset market, while shoppers with low real balances pay a ﬁxed cost
to obtain cash from the asset market. Shoppers with intermediate real balances are in the zone of
inactivity. They do not pay a ﬁxed cost; they simply spend their current real balances. Over time,
households stochastically cycle through the zones of activity and inactivity as their idiosyncratic
shocks vary. If the ﬁxed cost is zero, all agents are active, and the model reduces to the standard
one of Lucas (1984).
When discussing exchange rates, we abstract from trade in goods across countries in order to
focus on the role of asset market segmentation. By so doing, we follow the spirit of Lucas (1978)
in using marginal rates of substitution to price assets even though there is no trade in equilibrium.
There is a large literature in this general area. Our paper is clearly related to the work of
Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956). More recently, Jovanovic (1982), Romer (1986), and Chatterjee
and Corbae (1992) have developed general equilibrium versions of Baumol’s and Tobin’s models
and have used their versions to study how diﬀerent constant inﬂation rates aﬀect the steady state.1
In contrast to these studies, however, ours examines the dynamic responses of interest rates and
exchange rates to money growth shocks.
Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984, 1985) study the dynamic responses of
interest rates and exchange rates in deterministic models with exogenous segmentation. In addition
to this segmentation, the Grossman-Weiss-Rotemberg models also exogenously limit asset trade
to uncontingent bonds. Because of that market incompleteness, these models have–besides the
pure liquidity eﬀects from the trading frictions–complicated wealth eﬀects which eﬀectively limit
these studies to onetime unanticipated shocks in deterministic environments. Grossman (1987)
4extends this work to include proportional costs of trading money and assets and, hence, endogenous
segmentation, but because of the market incompleteness, his work is also limited to onetime
unanticipated shocks in deterministic environments.
We go beyond this literature by analyzing a fully stochastic model with shocks motivated
by the processes in the data. Such a step is clearly required to develop the empirical implications
of market segmentation. We take this step by drawing on a device of Lucas (1990) that lets us
abstract from wealth eﬀects. Lucas (1990) organizes agents into coalitions in which agents pool
their resources and choose consumption subject to a single budget constraint for the coalition as
a whole, subject to restrictions on the trading technology. Given the trading technology, then,
markets are complete. Thus, money injections have real eﬀects only because of the trading frictions
and not because of additional exogenous market incompleteness. We follow Lucas (1990) and allow
agents to trade a complete set of state-contingent bonds in the asset market in order to eliminate
complicated but inessential wealth eﬀects.
We diﬀer from Lucas (1990) in terms of both the trading friction used and the results
obtained. Lucas assumes that the coalition must divide its cash each period into one portion
to be used to purchase goods and another portion to be traded for bonds in the asset market
before the size of the current open market operation is announced. Unfortunately, in that model,
only unexpected money shocks have real eﬀects. Hence, the model cannot produce the Barr and
Campbell (1997) observations on expected inﬂation and real interest rates. Moreover, in that
model, liquidity eﬀects last only one period. Fuerst (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995)
extend Lucas’ (1990) model to include production, and they get similar results. Grilli and Roubini
(1992) and Schlagenhauf and Wrase (1995a) extend this work to the open economy. They also
ﬁnd that the response of real exchange rates to money injections lasts only one period. In related
work, Alvarez and Atkeson (1997) use coalitions to extend the work of Rotemberg (1985), but
with this friction, markets can be highly segmented only if velocity is extremely low.
In an extension of their basic model, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Chari, Chris-
tiano, and Eichenbaum (1995) add quadratic costs of adjusting the portfolio between periods to
the inﬁnite adjustment costs within the period. They show that this setup can generate persistent
liquidity eﬀects. Evans and Marshall (1998) use that extended model to analyze the responses of
interest rates of diﬀerent maturities to money shocks. Dotsey and Ireland (1995) and Schlagen-
hauf and Wrase (1995b) criticize the lack of symmetry in such a model between the adjustment
5costs within a period and across periods. Dotsey and Ireland (1995) show that when a model has
quadratic costs of adjustment both within and across periods, the liquidity eﬀects are small.
In contrast to the trading frictions in the literature initiated by Lucas (1990), our trading
frictions are close to those of the Baumol-Tobin models. These frictions can generate the Barr and
Campbell (1997) observations and persistent liquidity eﬀects even though costs are symmetric.
Moreover, in our study, all the results can be derived with paper and pencil, so that the essential
driving forces in the model are easily seen.
1. A One-Country Economy
First we sketch the basic outline of our model economy, and then we ﬁll in the details.
A. The Outline
We begin with a one-country cash-in-advance economy with an inﬁnite number of time periods
t =0 ,1,2,...,a government, and a continuum of households of measure 1. Trade in this economy
occurs in two separate locations: an asset market and a goods market. In the asset market,
households trade cash and bonds which promise delivery of cash in the asset market in the next
period, and the government introduces cash in the asset market via open market operations. In
the goods market, households use cash to buy goods subject to a cash-in-advance constraint, and
households sell their endowments of goods for cash. Households face a real ﬁxed cost of γ for each
transfer of cash between the asset market and the goods market. Except for this ﬁxed cost, the
model is a standard cash-in-advance model like Lucas’ (1984).
This economy has two sources of uncertainty: idiosyncratic shocks to households’ endow-
ments and shocks to money growth. The timing within each period t ≥ 1 is illustrated in Figure
1. We emphasize the physical separation between markets by placing the asset market in the top
half of the ﬁgure and the goods market in the bottom half. Households enter the period with the
cash P−1y−1 they obtained from selling their endowments at t − 1, where P−1 is the price level
and y−1 is their idiosyncratic random endowment at t − 1. The government conducts an open
market operation in the asset market, which determines the realization of money growth µ and
t h ec u r r e n tp r i c el e v e lP.
Each household then splits into a worker and a shopper. The worker sells the household
endowment y for cash Py and rejoins the shopper at the end of the period. The shopper takes
the household’s cash P−1y−1 with real value m = P−1y−1/P and shops for goods. The shopper
6can choose to pay the ﬁxed cost γ to transfer cash Px with real value x to or from the asset
market. This ﬁxed cost is paid in cash obtained in the asset market. If the shopper pays the ﬁxed
cost, then the cash-in-advance constraint is c = m + x, where c is consumption; otherwise, this
constraint is c = m.
Each household also enters the period with bonds that are claims to cash in the asset market
with payoﬀs contingent on both the household’s idiosyncratic endowment y−1 and the rate of
money growth µ in the current period. This cash either can be reinvested in the asset market or,
if the ﬁxed cost is paid, can be transferred to the goods market. In addition, if the ﬁxed cost is
paid, then cash from the goods market can be transferred to the asset market and used to buy
new bonds. In Figure 1, the asset market constraint is B =
R
qB0 + P(x + γ) if the ﬁxed cost
is paid and B =
R
qB0 otherwise, where B denotes the current realization of the state-contingent
bonds and
R
qB0 the household’s purchases of new bonds. At the beginning of the next period,
period t +1 , this household starts with cash Py in the goods market and contingent bonds B0 in
the asset market.
In equilibrium, some households choose to pay the ﬁxed cost to transfer cash between the
goods and asset markets while others do not. We refer to households that pay the ﬁxed cost as
active and households that do not as inactive. Households with either suﬃciently low real balances
or suﬃciently high real balances are active. Households with low real balances transfer cash from
the asset market to the goods market while those with high real balances transfer cash in the
opposite direction. Households with intermediate levels of real balances are in a zone of inactivity
and simply consume their current real balances.
In Figure 1 and the body of the paper, we assume that the shopper’s cash-in-advance con-
straint binds and that in the asset market households hold their assets in interest-bearing securities
rather than in cash. In Appendix A, we provide suﬃcient conditions for this assumption to hold.
B. The Details
Now we ﬂesh out the outline of this economy.
Each household’s endowment y is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across
households and across time with distribution F, which has density f. Let Y =
R
yf(y) dy be the
constant aggregate endowment. Let yt =( y0,...,y t) denote a typical history of individual shocks
to endowments up through period t and f(yt)=f(y0)f(y1)...f(yt) the probability density over
such histories. Let Mt denote the aggregate stock of money in period t and µt = Mt/Mt−1 the
7growth rate of that money supply. Let µt =( µ1,...,µ t) denote the history of money growth
shocks up through period t and g(µt) the probability density over such histories.
To make all households identical in period 0, we need to choose the initial conditions carefully.
In period 0, households have ¯ B units of government debt, which is a claim on ¯ B dollars in the
asset market in period 0. In this period, households trade only in bonds, not in goods. In period
1, households also have y0/µ1 real balances in the goods market, where y0 also has distribution F
and µ1 is the money growth shock at the beginning of period 1.
The government issues one-period bonds with payoﬀs contingent on the aggregate state µt.
In period t,g i v e ns t a t eµt, the government pays oﬀ outstanding bonds B(µt) in cash and issues
claims to cash in the next asset market of the form B(µt,µ t+1) at prices q =( µt,µ t+1).T h e










In period 0, this constraint is ¯ B =
R
µ1 q(µ1)B(µ1)dµ1.
In the asset market in each period and state, households trade a complete set of one-period
bonds that have payoﬀs next period which are contingent on both the aggregate event µt+1 and
the household’s endowment realization yt. A household in period t with aggregate state µt and
individual shock history yt−1 purchases B(µt,µ t+1,y t−1,y t) claims to cash that pay oﬀ in the next
period contingent on the aggregate shock µt+1 and the household’s endowment shock yt. We let
q(µt,µ t+1,y t) be the price of such a bond that pays one dollar in the asset market in period t +1
contingent on the relevant events. Because individual endowments are i.i.d., we assume that these
bond prices do not depend on the individual shock history yt−1.
Instead of letting each household trade in all possible claims contingent on other households’
endowments, we suppose that each household trades only in claims contingent on the household’s
own endowment with a ﬁnancial intermediary. This intermediary buys government bonds and
trades in the household-speciﬁc contingent claims. The latter approach is much less cumbersome
than the former and yields the same outcomes. Speciﬁcally, the intermediary buys government
bonds B(µt+1) and sells household-speciﬁc claims of the form B(µt+1,yt) to all the households in










8subject to the constraint B(µt+1)=
R
yt B(µt+1,y t)f(yt)dyt. Arbitrage implies that q(µt+1,y t)=
q(µt+1)f(yt).
Consider now the problem of an individual household. Let P(µt) denote the price level in
the goods market in period t. In that market, in each period t ≥ 1, a household starts with real
balances m(µt,y t−1). It then chooses transfers of real balances between the goods market and the
asset market x(µt,y t−1), an indicator variable z(µt,y t−1) equal to zero if these transfers are zero










where in (2), when t =1 , the term m(µt,y t−1) is given by y0/µ1. New money balances in period
t +1are given by m(µt+1,yt)=P(µt)yt/P(µt+1).
In the asset market, each period a household starts with contingent claims B(µt,y t−1) to
cash delivered in the asset market. The household purchases new bonds and makes cash transfers


























y0 q(µ1)B(µ1,y 0)f(y0) dy0dµ1. Assume
that both consumption and real bond holdings B(µt,y t−1)/P(µt) are uniformly bounded by some
large constants.













subject to the constraints (2)—(3).
The economy has a ﬁrm that transfers cash between the asset market and the goods market.
Since each transfer of cash consumes γ units of goods, the total resource cost of carrying out all
transfers at t is γ
R
z(µt,y t−1)f(yt−1)dyt−1. The ﬁr mp u r c h a s e st h e s eg o o d si nt h eg o o d sm a r k e t
with cash obtained from consumers.










t−1 = Y (5)




















for all t, µt. An equilibrium is deﬁned in the obvious way.
2. Characterizing Equilibrium
Here we solve for the equilibrium consumption and real balances of active and inactive households.
In the next section, we characterize the link between the consumption of active households and
asset prices.
Again, throughout we assume that the cash-in-advance constraint always binds and the
households hold only interest-bearing securities in the asset market. Under this assumption, a
household’s decision to pay the ﬁxed cost to trade in period t aﬀects only its current consumption
and bond holdings and not the real balances it holds in the goods market in later periods.
Inactive households simply consume the real balances they currently hold in the goods mar-
ket. More interesting is the consumption of active households. Since the economy has a complete
set of state-contingent bonds, once a household pays the ﬁxed cost to transfer cash between mar-
kets, it equates its intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to that of other active households.
Since all households are identical ex ante, all active households have a common consumption
level cA(µt) that depends only on the aggregate money shock µt and not on their idiosyncratic
endowments.
We ﬁrst construct the zones of activity and inactivity for an arbitrary consumption level cA,
and then we use the resource constraint to determine the equilibrium level. Deﬁne the function
h(m;cA)=[ U(cA) − U (m)] − U
0(cA)(cA + γ − m). (7)
This function measures the net gain to a household from switching from being an inactive house-
hold with consumption m to an active household with consumption cA. The ﬁrst two terms on the
right side of (7) measure the direct utility gain within the current period from the switch, while
the third term measures the utility cost of the required transfer of real balances from the asset
market. With cA ﬁxed, it is optimal for a household with real balances m to trade cash and bonds
and consume cA if h is positive and not to trade and instead consume m if h is negative. Note
that h is strictly convex in the argument m; it attains its minimum at m = cA and is negative at
this minimum if γ > 0. Thus, h typically crosses zero twice.





when both of these solutions exist. If (7) is negative for all m<c A, then set yL (cA,µ)=0 , while
if it is negative for all m>c A, then set yH (cA,µ)=∞. This cutoﬀ rule is illustrated in Figure 2.
Note that as the ﬁxed cost γ goes to zero, yL (cA,µ)/µ and yH (cA,µ)/µ converge to cA, so that
all households become active.
Given this form for the zones of activity and inactivity, we use the resource constraint to
determine the equilibrium values of active households’ consumption and corresponding cutoﬀs.
Together, the cash-in-advance constraint and constraints (5) and (6) imply that the price level is
P(µt)=M(µt)/Y, the inﬂation rate is πt = µt, real money holdings are m(µt,y t−1)=yt−1/µt,
and the consumption of inactive households is c(µt,yt−1)=yt−1/µt. Substituting the inactive
household’s consumption into the resource constraint (5) and using the cutoﬀ rule deﬁned in (8)
gives





yf(y) dy = Y, (9)
where we have suppressed the explicit dependence of cA,y H, and yL on µt. Clearly, these cutoﬀ
points and consumption levels of active households depend only on µt, while the consumption level
of inactive households depends only on (µt,y t−1).
If we ﬁx µt ≥ 1 and use (8) to solve for yL and yH as functions of cA, we see that the left
side of (9) is continuous and strictly monotonic in cA. Thus, any solution to the equations for the
equilibrium values of active households’ consumption and cutoﬀsi su n i q u e . These arguments give
the following. (For details, see Appendix A.)







yt−1/µt if yt−1 ∈ (yL (µt),yH (µt))
cA (µt) otherwise,
where the functions yL (µ),yH (µ),cA (µ) are the solutions to (8) and (9).
In our analysis of asset prices, we can use the sequence of budget constraints (3) to substitute
out for the household’s bond holdings and replace these constraints with a single period 0 constraint
11on household transfers of cash between the goods and asset markets. As we show in Appendix A,







where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on households’ period 0 budget constraint and Q(µt) is the
price in dollars in the asset market in period 0 for a dollar delivered in the asset market in period
t in state µt. Since all households are identical in period 0, the multipliers in the Lagrangian are
the same for all of them.
In what follows, we suppress reference to the state µt and write the price of an n-period
bond that costs qn













There is a key diﬀerence between this formula and the one that arises in the standard cash-in-
advance model. In the standard model, the relevant marginal utility for asset pricing is that of the
representative household, and the corresponding consumption is aggregate consumption. Here,
the relevant marginal utility for asset pricing in period t is that of the active households in period
t a n dt h a te x p e c t e df o rt h e mi np e r i o dt + n. These marginal utilities in periods t and t + n are
not those of any single household, but rather those of whichever households happen to be active
in those periods. This distinction is critical for the results that follow.
3. Asset Prices
Now we develop the economy’s links between money injections and asset prices. The link intro-
duced with market segmentation is how an active household’s consumption responds to a money
injection. We start with this link and then develop formulas for asset prices.
A. Money Injections and Consumption
We develop suﬃcient conditions for a money injection to raise the consumption of active house-
holds. We begin with a discrete example and follow with a continuous example.
Consider ﬁrst a simple example in which y takes on three values, y0 <y 1 <y 2, with
probabilities f0,f 1,f 2, respectively. We conjecture an equilibrium in which, when money growth
is ¯ µ, households with the central value of the endowment y1 choose not to trade and those with
low and high endowments y0 and y2 do choose to trade. Under this conjecture, for money growth
shocks µ close to ¯ µ, we know from the resource constraint that each active household consumes an
12equal share of the active households’ aggregate endowment plus the inﬂation tax levied on inactive











The corresponding cutoﬀs yL(cA (µ),µ),yH (cA (µ),µ) are found from (8). This conjecture is
valid as long as y0 <y L (cA (¯ µ),¯ µ) <y 1 <y H (cA (¯ µ),¯ µ) <y 2.
Clearly, an increase in the money growth rate µ raises the inﬂation tax levied on each inactive
household’s real balances. In equilibrium, asset prices adjust to redistribute these inﬂation tax
revenues to active households. In this example, the number of active households does not vary







which is the ratio of the total consumption of inactive households to that of active households.
Consider next an example in which y has a continuous density. Diﬀerentiating (8)—(9) gives
(
[F(yL)+1− F(yH)] + µf(yL)
Ã









































where ηi = U00(cA)[cA + γ − (yi/µ)]/[U0(cA) − U0(yi/µ)]. From (8) we know that yL/µ < cA <
(yH/µ)−γ. Thus, ηH and ηL a r ep o s i t i v ea n ds oi st h et e r mi nb r a c e so nt h el e f ts i d eo f( 14). On
the right side of (14), the ﬁrst term is positive and the last two terms are negative, so without
further restrictions, the sign of the right side is ambiguous. The ﬁrst term measures the eﬀect of
the inﬂation tax on the consumption of inactive households when the zone of inactivity is held
ﬁxed. The last two terms measure the change in the consumption of inactive households that
results from a change in the zone of inactivity. The fraction f(yL) of households at the lower
edge of the zone with real balances yL/µ become active, and the fraction f(yH) of households at
the upper edge of the zone with real balances yH/µ become inactive. As long as the fraction of
households at these edges is not too large, the consumption of active households increases.
For example, when y is uniform on [0,1] and yi are in (0,1), the right side of (14) simpliﬁes
to (yH − yL)(cA + γ)/µ, which is positive. Thus, under these restrictions, dcA/dlogµ is positive.
In Appendix B, we give an example in which dcA/dlogµ is positive and y has a log-normal
13distribution. Examples can, of course, also be constructed in which the fraction of households
at the edges of the zone is large and an increase in money growth decreases the consumption
of active households. Here, though, we focus on what we consider the standard case when the
opposite holds.
B. Money Injections and Asset Prices
We now turn to the link between money injections and asset prices. In order to get analytical
results, we make several assumptions. Let the log of money growth in period t be normally
distributed and have constant conditional variance over time. Let ¯ µ be deﬁned by log ¯ µ = E logµt,
where E is the unconditional expectation. Let U(c)=c1−σ/(1 − σ), where the risk aversion
parameter σ > 0. Let ¯ cA denote the consumption of active households when money growth is
equal to ¯ µ. To a ﬁrst-order approximation, the log of an active household’s marginal utility is





evaluated at µ =¯ µ. The parameter φ is the elasticity of an active household’s marginal utility
with respect to a money injection. Given these assumptions, we will analyze the relation between
money and interest rates.
4. Interest Rate Dynamics
Now we illustrate the dynamics of money injections, expected inﬂation, and interest rates. We
ﬁrst show that the model can produce the negative relation between expected inﬂation and real
interest rates noted by Barr and Campbell (1997). We then give conditions under which the eﬀect
of money injections on real interest rates dominates their eﬀect on expected inﬂation, so that
money injections have liquidity eﬀects.
We work out the model’s implications for the dynamics of the interest rate term structure
for two common processes for money growth and inﬂation: an autoregressive process and a long-
memory process. We begin with the autoregressive process because it is simple and it generates
the well-known Vasicek (1977) model for the dynamics of the term structure. Moreover, according
to Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998), autoregressive processes do a good job of approx-
imating the responses of money growth and interest rates to a money shock. Using a diﬀerent
VAR, however, Cochrane (1994) has found a more protracted response for money growth to a
14money shock. We model this as a long-memory process. We show that with such a process, a
money injection leads to a fall in the short-term nominal rate followed by a rise. We show that
the shock also twists the yield curve: on impact, short rates fall and long rates rise. At least since
Friedman (1968), economists have argued that money injections have these eﬀects on interest
rates. Moreover, Cochrane (1994) has found such a response for interest rates in his VAR.
Throughout the following analysis, money injections have two eﬀects on nominal interest
rates: an expected inﬂation eﬀect and a segmentation eﬀect, as can be seen from the Fisher
equation: ˆ ıt =ˆ rt+Etˆ πt+1, where i is the nominal interest rate and r is the real interest rate. (Here
and elsewhere, a caret over a character denotes a log-deviation.) Using a log-linear approximation
to (11), we can express the expected inﬂation eﬀect as
Etˆ πt+1 = Etˆ µt+1 (16)
and the segmentation eﬀect as
ˆ rt = φ(Etˆ µt+1 − ˆ µt), (17)
where φˆ µt and φEtˆ µt+1 are the eﬀects of the money injection on the active households’ marginal
utility in periods t and t +1 .
In the standard model, γ =0 , so φ =0and real interest rates are constant. In our model,
γ > 0, so φ > 0; thus, a money growth shock that increases µt also increases the consumption
of active households in t and drives down their marginal utility in t. If the money growth shock
raises expected money growth in t +1as well, then it raises consumption and lowers marginal
utility for active households in t +1 . As long as the money growth process is mean-reverting, so
that Etˆ µt+1 − ˆ µt is decreasing in ˆ µt, an increase in money growth drives down real interest rates.
With such processes, the model reproduces the negative relation between expected inﬂation and
real rates found by Barr and Campbell (1997), since a money injection drives expected inﬂation
up and real rates down.
Our model produces liquidity eﬀects when the segmentation eﬀect (17) dominates the ex-
pected inﬂation eﬀect (16). The overall magnitude of the segmentation eﬀect depends on two
parameters: the elasticity of the marginal utility of active households with respect to money
growth φ and the persistence of a money growth shock as measured by Etˆ µt+1−ˆ µt. The segmenta-
tion eﬀect increases the higher is φ, that is, the more responsive is an active household’s marginal
15utility to a money injection. This eﬀect is smaller the greater is the persistence of money growth.
I fm o n e yg r o w t hi st e m p o r a r y ,t h e nag i v e nm o n e yi n j e c t i o nw i l ll e a dt oat e m p o r a r yi n c r e a s e
in active households’ consumption and, hence, to a relatively large drop in the real interest rate.
As the shock to money growth becomes more persistent, a given money injection leads to a more
permanent increase in active households’ consumption and, hence, to a smaller drop in the real
interest rate.
We turn now to an analysis of the two common processes for money growth and inﬂation.
Example 1. Autoregressive Process
Assume that money injections satisfy ˆ µt+1 = ρˆ µt + εt+1, where ρ is the persistence of the money
shock and εt+1 is a normal, i.i.d. innovation with mean zero and variance σ2
². The expected
inﬂation eﬀect is given by Etˆ πt+1 = ρˆ µt, while the segmentation eﬀect is given by ˆ rt = φ(ρ−1)ˆ µt.
As long as money growth is mean-reverting, so that ρ < 1, expected inﬂation and real rates move





then the segmentation eﬀect dominates the expected inﬂation eﬀect, and a money injection leads
to a fall in nominal interest rates on impact.
Consider next the dynamics of the short-term interest rate. Since Etˆ πt+k+1 = ρkEtˆ πt+1
and Etˆ rt+k = ρkˆ rt, we have that Etˆ ıt+k = ρkˆ ıt. Thus, real and nominal interest rates have the
same persistence as do money shocks. If (18) holds, then a money injection leads nominal rates
to initially fall and decay back to zero at rate ρ. Clearly, these liquidity eﬀects are persistent
whenever money shocks are persistent.
Consider the eﬀects on the yield curve. In our model, the dynamics of the term structure
satisﬁes the expectations hypothesis: movements in long-term rates are an average of movements
in expected future short-term rates. In fact, this is true for any log-linear model with constant
conditional variances.2 When (18) holds, so that the segmentation eﬀect dominates the expected
inﬂation eﬀect, a money injection lowers the shorter yields by more than the longer yields and
thus steepens the yield curve. Each yield follows an autoregressive process and returns to its mean
value at rate ρ. For this example, then, our general equilibrium model generates the dynamics of
the term structure summarized by the Vasicek (1977) model.
Consider the magnitude of φ required for liquidity eﬀects for this autoregressive example.
16Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998) argue that the impulse response for M2 growth fol-
lowing a money shock is well-approximated by an autoregressive process with ρ = .5. With this
persistence, (18) implies that the model produces liquidity eﬀects for φ ≥ 1. Getting a handle on
the level of segmentation in the data is harder. To get a rough feel for what diﬀerent levels of φ
entail, note that combining the formula from our discrete example (13) with equation (15) gives
that
φ = σ
Total consumption of inactive households
Total consumption of active households
. (19)
Consider φ =2 . In order to interpret this value, we need to take a stand on the risk aversion
parameter σ. T h el i t e r a t u r eu s e saw i d er a n g eo fe s t i m a t e sf o rσ. The business cycle literature
commonly uses σ =2 , but estimates easily range as high as σ =8 .W i t hσ =2 , (19) implies that
we need half of the households to be not actively trading money for interest-bearing assets in any
g i v e np e r i o di no r d e rt og e n e r a t eφ =2 .W i t hσ =8 , we only need one-ﬁfth of the households to
be inactive in order to get φ =2 .
We illustrate the model’s predictions in Figure 3. In the top panel of the ﬁgure, we graph
the impulse responses to a money shock of money growth and (annualized) short-term nominal
interest rates with φ =2 . The responses are similar to those found by Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1998) using M2. In the bottom panel of Figure 3, we graph the yield curves at three
diﬀerent times: at the time of the shock’s impact, one quarter after the shock, and three quarters
after the shock. These responses show the yield curve steepening on impact and then reverting
slowly to its normal position. Since interest rates in the model satisfy the expectations hypothesis,
the impulse response plot for the short-term rate completely determines the dynamics of yields
of long maturities. (Actually, the impulse response of Etit+k is the response of the one-period
forward rate of maturity k in period t, and the yields are just averages of the forward rates.) So
the plots in the two panels of Figure 3 are just two ways to summarize the same information.
Example 2. Long-Memory Process
In Cochrane (1994), the impulse response for M2 decays more slowly than does an autoregressive
process. We model this slow decay with a long-memory process.
Consider the moving-average process ˆ µt =
P∞
j=0 θjεt−j, where θj are the moving-average
coeﬃcients and εt is a white noise process. The long-memory process is a moving-average process





θj−1 for j ≥ 1 and −1/2 <d<1/2,
17and the εt−j are independent and distributed N(0,σ2
ε). The parameter d c o n t r o l st h er a t eo fd e c a y
of the moving-average coeﬃcients. These coeﬃcients decay at a rate (1 − d)/j < 1. For large j,
this rate approaches zero, which is the source of the long memory.
















Here, in the brackets, the ﬁrst term is the segmentation eﬀect and the second is the expected
inﬂation eﬀect. Since the coeﬃcients θj are all positive, for large enough j the expected inﬂation
eﬀect must dominate the segmentation eﬀect, and αj must be positive. If φ >d / (1 − d), then for
j =1 , the segmentation eﬀect outweighs the expected inﬂation eﬀect, and so for small j, αj is
n e g a t i v e .I fw ei g n o r ei n t e g e r s ,w es e et h a tαj goes from negative to positive at j∗ =( 1+φ)(1−d).
Notice that the more segmented is the market, the longer is the period in which the segmentation
eﬀect outweighs the expected inﬂation eﬀect.
We illustrate the pattern implied by the long-memory process with d =1 /4 and φ =2in
Figure 4. In the top panel, we see that the nominal rate drops on the money shock’s impact
and then rises in the third quarter after the shock. Interestingly, this pattern is similar to that
estimated by Cochrane (1998), which he argues is representative of results in the VAR literature.
In the bottom panel, we plot the yield curves on impact, one quarter after the shock, and three
quarters after the shock. In this ﬁgure, we see that on impact, the money growth shock twists the
yield curve, lowering short yields and raising long ones. After several quarters, short yields rise
and all yields slowly move back to their average values.
5. Exchange Rates
Having demonstrated that our segmented market model can reproduce the major observed interest
rate responses to money injections, we turn now to exchange rates. Here the features we want to
reproduce are diﬀerent for countries with diﬀerent rates of inﬂation. In low inﬂation countries, real
and nominal exchange rates have similar volatility, are highly correlated, and are persistent. (See
Mussa 1986 and our Table 1.) In high inﬂation countries, nominal exchange rates are substantially
more volatile than real exchange rates. (See Figure 6.) The standard model cannot reproduce
these observations. We develop a two-country version of our segmented markets economy that
can.
18A. A Two-Country Economy
First we develop a more sophisticated representation of monetary policy than we used in the one-
country model. Earlier we explored the implications of the one-country model only for the impulse
responses to exogenous money shocks. Here we explore the model’s predictions for some uncondi-
tional moments of the data, so we need to take a ﬁr m e rs t a n do nt h ep o l i c yr u l ef o l l o w e db yt h e
monetary authority. As we document below, in the data, nominal interest rates are substantially
more persistent than money growth rates. To capture this, we model money growth as the sum
of an exogenous component and an endogenous component which oﬀsets a type of money demand
shock.
Consider now a two-country, cash-in-advance economy that extends the work of Lucas (1982).
We refer to one country as the home country and the other as the foreign country. For simplicity,
we abstract from trade in goods by having the households in each country desire only the local
good. Speciﬁcally, households in the home country use the home currency, called dollars, to
purchase a home good. Households in the foreign country use the foreign currency, called euros,
to purchase a foreign good. In the asset market, households trade the two currencies and dollar and
euro bonds which promise delivery of the relevant currency in the asset market in the next period,
and the two governments introduce their currencies via open market operations. As before, each
transfer of cash between the asset market and any individual household in either goods market
has a real ﬁxed cost of γ.
In order to generate a type of money demand shock, we allow shocks to the distribution of
idiosyncratic endowments in the two countries. The densities of the endowments are now given
by f(y;θt) and f(y∗;θ
∗
t), where θt and θ
∗
t are i.i.d. shocks, both with mean ¯ θ. Thus, the aggregate
shock is st =( µt,µ ∗
t,θt,θ
∗
t),a n dst =( s1,...,s t) is its history. Let g(st) denote the density of the
probability distribution over such histories.
We let home households trade a complete set of dollar-denominated claims with a world
intermediary, and we let foreign households similarly trade euro-denominated claims. The home
government’s bonds are dollar bonds, and its budget constraint is (1) as before. The foreign
government’s bonds are euro bonds, and its budget constraint is the obvious analog. The world
intermediary buys both dollar- and euro-denominated government bonds and trades in both dollar
and euro household-speciﬁc contingent claims in order to maximize proﬁts for each aggregate state
st+1. Lack of arbitrage across currencies implies that q(st,s t+1)=q∗(st,s t+1)e(st)/e(st+1).H e r eq
19and q∗ are the prices for one-period dollar and euro bonds and e is the nominal exchange rate in
terms of dollars per euro. We use this relationship to solve for movements in nominal exchange
rates.
T os o l v ef o rt h ep e r i o d0 nominal exchange rate e0, we need to choose the initial conditions
carefully. In period 0, home households have ¯ Bh units of the home government debt and ¯ B∗
h units
of the foreign government debt, which are claims on ¯ Bh dollars and ¯ B∗
h euros in the asset market
in that period. In period 0, there is no trade in goods; households simply trade bonds. Likewise,
foreign households start period 0 with ¯ Bf units of the home government debt and ¯ B∗
f units of the
foreign government debt in the asset market. We require that ¯ Bh + ¯ Bf = ¯ B and ¯ B∗
h + ¯ B∗
f = ¯ B∗,
where ¯ B is the initial stock of home government debt in dollars and ¯ B∗ is the initial stock of
foreign government debt in euros.
The constraints for the home households are the same as before except that now, in period





y0 q(s1)B(s1,y 0)f(y0) ds1dy0. The constraints for the foreign
households are the obvious analogs, with the foreign households having initial assets of ( ¯ Bf/e0)+ ¯ B∗
f
in euros in period 0. The resource constraint for the home good and the money market—clearing
conditions for dollars are similar to those in (5) and (6) except that the distribution of endowments
is now indexed by the current realization θt. Analogous constraints hold for the foreign good and
euros.
In equilibrium, the period 0 nominal exchange rate e0 =
³
¯ B − ¯ Bh
´
/ ¯ B∗
h. To see this, iterate
on (1) and (3) for the home household, and take limits to show that ¯ B = ¯ Bh + e(s0) ¯ B∗
h. Clearly,
this exchange rate e0 exists and is positive as long as ¯ Bh < ¯ B and ¯ B∗
h > 0 or ¯ Bh > ¯ B and ¯ B∗
h < 0.
The equilibrium consumption of households in the home country is similar to that described
in Proposition 1. Speciﬁcally, the cutoﬀ rule for trade is the same, but (9) is replaced by





yf(y;θt) dy = Y, (20)
so that the equilibrium consumption of active home households is given by cA(µt;θt). The analogous
result holds for households in the foreign country. This implies that active household consumption
in the two countries responds only to injections of the local currency and the local shock to
endowments.
To develop the asset pricing formulas for this two-country economy, recall from (10) that
period 0 nominal dollar asset prices Q(st) are given by the marginal utility of a dollar for active
home households. Likewise, period 0 euro asset prices Q∗(st) are given by the analogous marginal
20utility for active foreign households. Arbitrage requires that nominal exchange rates satisfy e(st)=














Since P(st)=M(st)/Y,and likewise for P ∗, the nominal exchange rate is e(st)=x(st)M(st)/M ∗(st).
In period t in aggregate state st, state-contingent dollar bond prices are given by (11)a n dl i k e w i s e
for state-contingent euro bond prices.
B. Exchange Rates With Low Inﬂation
Now we describe a process for monetary policy relevant for low inﬂation countries and derive the
model’s implications for the volatility and persistence of exchange rates.
In the data, interest rates are much more persistent than money growth. Yet recall from
Example 1 that in the simple model with only money shocks, interest rates and money growth
are equally persistent. A simple way to address this discrepancy between the data and the simple
model is to assume that part of monetary policy is exogenous and persistent while another part
is endogenous and oﬀsets transient money demand shocks. The endogenous part essentially adds
a transient component to money growth that does not appear in interest rates.
In our two-country model, therefore, we assume that the monetary authority follows an
interest rate policy of the form ˆ ıt+1 = ρˆ ıt +εt+1. It implements this policy rule by choosing money
growth to be the sum of two components:
ˆ µt =ˆ µ1t + v(µ1t,θt), (22)
where µ1t is the exogenous part of monetary policy that follows an autoregressive process ˆ µ1t+1 =
ρˆ µ1t + εµt+1 and v(µ1t,θt) is the endogenous part of monetary policy that oﬀsets the shock θt to
endowments. Thus, v(µ1t,θt) solves cA(µ1t +( µ1t,θt);θt)=cA(µ1t;¯ θ), so that, in equilibrium, the
consumption of active households does not respond to the shock θt. Clearly, ∂v(µ1,¯ θ)/∂µ1 =0 . In
what follows, we suppress all references to ¯ θ and instead write the consumption of active households
as cA(µ1t). We assume that foreign money growth is set in a similar way and that the shocks to
both the exogenous and endogenous parts of foreign monetary policy are independent of those to
home monetary policy.
To a ﬁrst-order approximation, the log of v is given by ˆ vt = ηˆ θt. The log of the marginal
utility of consumption for active home households is given as before, with φ deﬁn e da si n( 15),
21with µ1 replacing µ. The log of the marginal utility of consumption for active foreign households
is approximated in the analogous fashion, with φ
∗ being the elasticity of the marginal utility of
active foreign households with respect to a foreign money injection.
We have from (17) that the real interest rate depends only on the exogenous part of monetary
policy. Thus, ˆ rt = φ(ρ−1)ˆ µ1t. In contrast, inﬂa t i o na n dm o n e yg r o w t hd e pe n do nbo t hc o m po n e n t s
and are given by ˆ πt+1 =ˆ µt+1 =ˆ µ1t+ηˆ θt. To see that the money growth rate rule in (22) implements
the assumed interest rate rule, note that since Etπt+1 = ρˆ µ1t, the nominal interest rate is
ˆ ıt =ˆ rt + Etˆ πt+1 =[ φ(ρ − 1) + ρ]ˆ µ1t.
Thus, the serial correlation of the nominal interest rate is ρ while the serial correlation of inﬂation
is lower than ρ because of the i.i.d. component from money demand shocks.
Consider the implications of this model for the behavior of real exchange rates. Equation
(21)i m p l i e st h a t




Clearly, then, the more segmented a market is, the greater is the volatility of real exchange rates.
Moreover, the persistence of real exchange rates is determined by the persistence of the interest
rate rule.
To get a feel for the quantitative implications of the model, consider a simple numerical
example. We set ρ = .95, which is the serial correlation of the U.S. federal funds rate on a
quarterly basis (1960:1—1999:3).3 We choose η std(ˆ θ) so that the serial correlation of money
growth is .75, which is the serial correlation of quarterly M2 growth (1960:1—1999:3). We assume
symmetry across countries, so that φ = φ
∗, and we assume that shocks are independent across
countries. We simulate the model for 120 time periods, HP-ﬁlter the data, and consider the mean
values of several statistics over 50 simulations.
In Figure 5, we plot against φ three statistics based on these simulations: the standard devi-
ation of the nominal exchange rate relative to that of the real exchange rate [std(loge)/std(logx)],
the correlation of the real and nominal exchange rates [corr(loge,logx)], and the serial correlation
(or persistence) of the real exchange rate [corr(logx,logx−1)]. We see that as φ becomes large, the
volatility of the real exchange rate becomes closer to that of the nominal exchange rate, and the
correlation of the real and nominal rates grows. We also see that real exchange rates essentially
inherit the persistence of nominal interest rates regardless of φ.
22In Table 1 we report on these same three statistics for a number of low inﬂation countries.
Comparing Figure 5 to Table 1, we see that as the segmentation parameter is increased to 6, the
relative volatility and the correlation of nominal and real exchange rates in the model begin to
approach 1, the level that both approximate in the data. The persistence of real exchange rates in
the model is similar to that in the data (around .8) for any value of the segmentation parameter.
The numbers in this example are useful to give a feel for how the model works with a moderate
amount of segmentation. Clearly, to do a more complete comparison between the model and the
data, we would need to include real shocks, which would raise the volatility of real exchange rates.
C. Exchange Rates With High Inﬂation
Now we shift to high inﬂation countries. We ﬁr s td o c u m e n tt h a ti nh i g hi n ﬂation countries, the
volatility of nominal exchange rates is substantially greater than that of real exchange rates, while
in low inﬂation countries, these volatilities are similar. This diﬀerence is obvious in Figure 6, which
displays the ratio of the standard deviations of the nominal and real exchange rates based on HP-
ﬁltered data for 41 countries.4 In this section, we discuss how the degree of market segmentation,
as measured by the parameter φ, varies with the average rate of money growth. In particular, we
show that if the average rate of inﬂation is high enough, almost all households choose to pay the
ﬁxed cost, so that asset markets are no longer segmented. Thus, as inﬂation becomes high enough,
the volatility of real exchange rates becomes much smaller than that of nominal exchange rates.
For simplicity, consider again an example in which y takes on three values, y0 <y 1 <y 2, with
probabilities f0,f 1,f 2, respectively, and we hold the money demand shock θ constant. Consider
t h ed e g r e eo fs e g m e n t a t i o ni nac o u n t r yw i t hl o wa v e r a g ei n ﬂation ¯ µA a n di nac o u n t r yw i t hh i g h
average inﬂation ¯ µB. For the low inﬂation country, assume that y0 <y L(cA (¯ µA),¯ µA) <y 1 <








For the high inﬂation country, we proceed as follows. Under an assumption that households’
utility is suﬃciently curved, we can show that there exists a high enough inﬂa t i o nr a t es u c ht h a t
all households pay the ﬁxed cost. More formally, we have
Proposition 2. Assume that the support of y is bounded by ¯ y and that 1 − σ <
Y −γ
Y . Then a
suﬃciently high inﬂation rate exists such that all households are traders and φ =0 .
23Proof. Let xL ∈ [0,Y − γ] be the solution to h(x;Y − γ)=0 .W e ﬁrst show that, under our
assumption on σ, this solution with xL > 0 exists. Then we show that when ¯ µB > ¯ y/xL, all
households choose to pay the ﬁxed cost to trade.
To show that xL > 0, we need to show that there is a solution to h(x;Y − γ)=0in the
interval (0,Y−γ). Recall that h(x;Y −γ) is minimized at x = Y −γ and is negative at this point.
Thus, we need only show that h(0;Y − γ) > 0. The condition on σ ensures that this inequality
holds. Note that h(0;Y − γ) ≤ 0 if that condition is violated.
To see that all households choose to trade when ¯ µB > ¯ y/xL, observe that cA = Y − γ,
that yL = xL¯ µB, yH = xH¯ µB solve (7) and (9), and that yL > ¯ y. Thus, we know that traders’
consumption does not depend on money growth µ and φ =0 .
Proposition 2 implies that as inﬂation becomes suﬃciently high, the segmentation eﬀect
diminishes and real exchange rates become much less volatile than nominal exchange rates. One
can construct examples in which the segmentation parameter φ declines smoothly with µ. In this
sense, our model can generate the pattern in the data documented in Figure 6.
6. Conclusion
We have developed a model in the spirit of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) that captures the idea
that when a government injects money through an open market operation, only a fraction of the
households in the economy are on the other side of the transaction; hence, money injections have
segmentation eﬀects in addition to their standard Fisherian eﬀects. We have deliberately kept the
model simple to allow an analytical solution. We have shown that this model generates features
of the data which standard models do not: a negative relation between expected inﬂation and real
interest rates and, with moderate amounts of segmentation, both persistent liquidity eﬀects and
volatile and persistent exchange rates.
In order to generate volatile real exchange rates, a model needs frictions in both the goods
and asset markets. (See, for example, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 1998.) Here we abstract
from friction in the goods market, such as sticky prices (for example, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ1 995),
in order to focus on friction in the asset market. Our work thus complements work on goods market
frictions and highlights a potentially important component of a complete model of exchange rates
with frictions in both types of markets.
24Notes
1An extensive literature dating back at least to Merton (1987) considers asset market seg-
mentation in models without money. See, for example, Hirshleifer (1988), Aiyagari and Gertler
(1991), Cuny (1993), Allen and Gale (1994), Balasko, Cass, and Shell (1995), Saito (1996), and
Basak and Cuoco (1998) and the references cited therein.
2Of course, there is substantial evidence that the expectations hypothesis is a poor ap-
proximation of the dynamics of the term structure. (See Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997.)
Addressing that problem, however, is beyond our scope here.
3Notice that the unconditional persistence of the federal funds rate is much higher than the
conditional response of that rate following a money shock as estimated by Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1998). They argue that the monetary authority sets interest rates as a function of
some other variables in the economy which are very persistent. Here we abstract from those other
variables, so we simply make the interest rates follow a highly persistent AR(1) process.
4We use the International Monetary Fund’s data from its publication International Finan-
cial Statistics covering the period 1970:1—1999:3 for the following countries: Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Singa-
pore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and Venezuela. For each country, we use the bilateral nominal exchange rate and the consumer
price index—based bilateral real exchange rate with the United States.
25Appendix A
In this appendix, we provide suﬃcient conditions to ensure that households never carry over cash
in either the goods market or the asset market.
To allow for the possibility that a household may hold cash, we modify the household con-
straints as follows. In the goods markets, we denote unspent real balances that the shopper might












We write new money balances as m(µt+1,yt)=P(µt)[yt + a(µt,yt−1)]/P(µt+1) and add the
cash-in-advance constraint a(µt,y t−1) ≥ 0. In the asset market, we replace the budget constraints






























where N(µt−1,y t−2) is cash held over from the previous asset market and N(µt,y t−1) is cash held
over into the next asset market. Let N(µt,y t−1) ≥ 0 and N(µt−1,yt−2)=N0 in period t =1 . In




y0 q(µ1)B(µ1,y 0)f(y0)dy0dµ1+N0. Otherwise,
the household’s problem is unchanged.
We develop our suﬃcient conditions in several steps. We ﬁrst characterize the household’s
optimal choice of c and x given prices and arbitrary rules for m,a, and z and summarize these
results in Lemma 1. We then characterize the household’s trading rule z given an arbitrary rule for
m,a and the optimal rules for c and x, and we summarize these results in Lemma 2. These lemmas
complete the proof of Proposition 1 in the text. In Lemma 3, we provide suﬃcient conditions on
the money growth process and the endowments process to ensure that a and N are always zero.
Start by using the sequence of budget constraints (26) to substitute out for the household’s
bond holdings. Replace these constraints with a single period 0 constraint on household transfers
of cash between the goods and asset markets. Any bounded allocation and bond holdings that




























t ≤ ¯ B.
Thus, the household’s problem can be restated as follows. Choose real money holdings m
and a, trading rule z, consumption and transfers c and x, and cash in the asset market N, subject
to constraints (25) and (27) and the cash-in-advance constraint.
Consider now a household’s optimal choice of consumption c(µt,yt−1) and transfers of dol-
lar real balances x(µt,y t−1) given prices Q(µt),P(µt), arbitrary feasible choices of real money
holdings m(µt,y t−1) and a(µt,yt−1), and a trading rule z(µt,y t−1). These choices maximize the
Lagrangian corresponding to the household’s problem. Let ν(µt,yt−1) be the multiplier on (25)
and λ be the multiplier on (27). The ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to c and x respectively
are then given by β
tU0(c(µt,yt−1))g(µt)f(yt−1)=ν(µt,y t−1) and λQ(µt)P(µt)z(µt,y t−1)f(yt−1)=
ν(µt,yt−1)z(µt,y t−1). For those states such that z(µt,yt−1)=1 , these two ﬁrst-order conditions
imply that β
tU0(c(µt,y t−1))g(µt)=λQ(µt)P(µt). Since all households are identical in period 0,
the multipliers in the Lagrangian are the same for all households. We summarize this discussion
as follows:
Lemma 1. All households that choose to pay the ﬁxed cost for a given aggregate state µt have
identical consumption c(µt,y t−1)=cA(µt) for some function cA. Households that choose not to
pay the ﬁxed cost have consumption c(µt,y t−1)=m(µt,y t−1) − a(µt,y t−1).
Next consider a household’s optimal choice of whether to pay the ﬁxed cost to trade given
prices Q(µt), P(µt) and its arbitrary feasible choices of real money holdings in the goods market
m(µt,yt−1),a (µt,y t−1). From Lemma 1, we have the form of the optimal consumption and transfer
rules corresponding to the choices of z =1and z =0 . Substituting these rules into (4) and (27)



















































Q(µt)P(µt)[cA(µt)+γ − (m(µt,y t−1) − a(µt,yt−1))]z(µt,y t−1)f(yt−1) dµtdyt−1.
27Let η denote the Lagrange multiplier on (29), and consider the following variational argu-



















which is simply the direct utility gain U(cA(µt)) minus the cost of the required transfers. The









which is simply the direct utility gain, since there are no transfers. The ﬁrst-order condition
with respect to cA is β
tU0(cA(µt))g(µt)=ηQ(µt)P(µt). Subtracting (31) from (30) and using the
ﬁrst-order condition when z =1gives the cutoﬀ rules deﬁned by (8). More formally, we have
Lemma 2. Given active households’ consumption cA(µt), a household chooses z(µt,y t−1)=0if








These lemmas complete the proof of Proposition 1. To complete our asset pricing formulas,
we need to compute the equilibrium value of the multiplier λ. Given the equilibrium values of






















Households will not want to store cash in the asset market if nominal interest rates are
positive. Thus, to ensure that N =0 , we need only check that nominal interest rates are always
positive. We now turn to the problem of developing conditions suﬃcient to ensure that households
never want to store cash in the goods market.
Assume that households have constant relative risk aversion utility of the form U(c)=
c1−σ/(1 − σ). Let Q(µt) and P(µt) be the prices constructed above when a and N are assumed
equal to zero.
Consider ﬁrst the consumption of a household that deviates from the strategy of never
holding cash from one period to the next in the goods market. From Lemmas 1 and 2, we
have that, with a ﬁxed plan {at(µt,yt−1)} for holding cash in the goods market, this deviant
household’s consumption choices are similar to those of a household that does not hold cash in
28the goods market. In particular, in those states of nature in which the deviant chooses to pay the
ﬁxed cost to trade, from Lemma 1, the household’s consumption satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
β
tU0(cd
A(µt))g(µt)=ηdQ(µt)P(µt), where ηd is the Lagrange multiplier on this household’s period
0 budget constraint. Thus, in those states in which the deviant household pays the ﬁxed cost to
trade, it equates its marginal rate of substitution to that of other active households that do not
deviate. Given constant risk aversion, this implies that cd
A(µt)=θcA(µt) for all µt for some ﬁxed
factor of proportionality θ. In those states of nature in which the deviant household does not choose
to pay the ﬁxed cost, its consumption is cd(µt,y t−1)=md(µt,yt−1)− ad(µt,yt−1), and its decision
whether to pay the ﬁx e dc o s ti sd e t e r m i n e db yt h ec u t o ﬀs yL(θcT(µt),µ t) and yH(θcT(µt),µ t)
d e s c r i b e di nL e m m a2 .S i n c emd(µt,y t−1)=[ yt−1 + ad(µt−1,y t−2)]/µt and, in the event that the
deviant household pays the ﬁxed cost, xd(µt,yt−1)=θcT(µt) − [md
t(µt,y t−1) − ad(µt,yt−1)], the
factor of proportionality θ (and the implied Lagrange multiplier ηd) that corresponds to any ﬁxed
plan {at(µt,y t−1)} for holding cash in the goods market must be set so that the deviant household’s





















where z(µt,y t−1)=1if {[yt−1 + ad(µt−1,y t−2)]/µt} − ad(µt,y t−1) is in the interval
[yL(θcT(µt),µ t)/µt,y H(θcT(µt),µ t)/µt] and z(µt,y t−1)=0otherwise.
Next observe that, since the cutoﬀs yL(θcT(µt),µ t) and yH(θcT(µt),µ t) are monotonically
increasing in θ for all values of µt, no deviant household would choose a plan {at(µt,y t−1)} for
holding cash in the goods market such that the implied factor of proportionality θ was so small
that yH(θcT(µt),µ t) ≤ yL(cT(µt),µ t) for all possible realizations of µt. To see this, observe that the
consumption of such a deviant household would lie below the consumption we have constructed
for a household that never holds cash in the goods market in every possible state of nature µt,y t−1.
Thus, the utility of such a deviant household would have to be lower than that of a household
t h a tn e v e rh e l dc a s hi nt h eg o o d sm a r k e t .L e t¯ θ =s u p{θ|yH(θcT(µt),µ t) ≤ yL(cT(µt),µ t)}.
Lemma 3. It is optimal for a household to never hold over cash in the goods market if, for all
a ≥ 0,µ t and θ ≥ ¯ θ,
U0(
yH(θcA(µt),µt)















µt+1 [F(yL(θcA(µt+1),µ t+1)−a)+1−F(yH(θcA(µt+1),µ t+1)−a)]g(µt+1|µt) dµt+1.
29Proof. Given any plan {at(µt,y t−1)} for holding cash in the goods market and an associated value
of θ, the highest consumption that a deviant household could have in period t is yH(θcT(µt),µ t)/µt,
and thus, U0(yH(θcT(µt),µ t)/µt) is the smallest marginal utility of consumption it could have in
that period.The terms on the right side of the condition in the lemma are the expected value of the
product of the marginal utility of consumption and the return to holding currency in the goods
market (1/µt+1) in period t +1 . Thus, the condition in the lemma ensures that such a household
always prefers to consume its real balances in period t rather than carry them over into period
t +1at a rate of return 1/µt+1. Therefore, this condition implies that no plan for holding cash in
the goods market gives higher utility than the plan of never holding cash in the goods market.
Appendix B
In this appendix, we solve for φ when the endowment y is log-normal, with logy having a normal
distribution with mean zero and variance σ2
y. The resource constraint is

























where F(logyL,;0,σy) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a normal mean zero standard












































Now (33) is the integral of the density of a normal distribution with mean σ2
y and variance σ2
y.
Thus, the resource constraint can be written as






















Given µ, the equilibrium values of cT,y L, and yH are found as the solution to the equations
(5) and (7). We solve these equations numerically for σ =2 , γ = .005, σy = .03, and ¯ µ =1 .03.25,
so that annualized inﬂation is 3 percent. With these parameters φ =2 .14.
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33Table 1
Exchange Rates in Low Inflation Countries
Quarterly, 1970:1–1999:3
Features of Exchange Rates With the U.S. Dollar
Country
Mean Inflation









Canada 5.2 .96 .93 .79
France 5.9 1.06 .99 .78
Germany 3.4 1.01 .98 .76
Italy 9.0 1.10 .98 .79
Japan 4.0 1.00 .98 .79
United Kingdom 7.5 1.06 .97 .78
SOURCE.— International Monetary FundFigure 1   Timing in the Two Markets
If transfer x, 
pay fixed cost Pγ.
Cash-in-Advance Constraint
Consumption:
c = m + x if cash transferred.
c = m     if no transfer.
Real balances
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Asset Market Constraint
Bonds:
B =  qB′ + P(x+γ) if cash transferred.
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growth µ observedFigure 2   Cutoff Rule Defining Zones of Activity and Inactivity
Inactive Active Active
cA cA + γ yL
µ
yH







h(m;cA)Figures 3–4 How Our Model Responds to a Money Shock How Our Model Responds to a Money Shock
Figure 3 Patterns Implied by Patterns Implied by
an Autoregressive Process
Figure 4 Patterns Implied by Patterns Implied by
a Long-Memory Process
a. Impulse Responses of Short-Term Nominal 
Interest Rates and Money Growth
a. Impulse Responses of Short-Term Nominal 
Interest Rates and Money Growth
b. Interest Rate Yield Curve on Shock’s Impact
and One and Three Quarters Later
b. Interest Rate Yield Curve on Shock’s Impact
and One and Three Quarters Later
−.5







































































Relative Volatility of Nominal and Real
Ratio of Standard Deviations of Nominal and Real Exchange Rates
vs. Mean of Log of Consumer Price Index Changes
in 41 Selected Countries, 1970:1–1999:3
Exchange Rates vs. Inflation
Mean of Log of Inflation
Note: The cluster of countries with low relative volatility of nominal and real exchange 
rates and low inflation includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India,  Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, 
Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United 
Kingdom.
Source: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics) 
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